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NOTES & COMMENTS
COMMENT
NO RUNS, NO HITS, TWO ERRORS:
HOW MARYLAND ERRED IN PROHIBITING
REPLACEMENT PLAYERS FROM CAMDEN YARDS
DURING THE 1994-95 MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL STRIKE

I. INTRODUCTION

In August 1994, major league baseball experienced its eighth work
stoppage in twenty-two years when the Major League Players Association
("Players Association" or "union") went on strike. As in previous work
stoppages, economics were a primary factor. Owners felt they were in
financial distress and wanted to cap player salaries in order to ensure
profitability. Players, whose yearly salaries averaged more than $1
million, did not want to cede past negotiating gains and did not feel it was
their responsibility to make sure the owners made money.
This work stoppage was different from the previous strikes and
lockouts in several important respects:
* It caused the first cancellation of the World Series since 1903;
* It occurred at a time when baseball was without a commissioner.
(Previous commissioners had taken partial responsibility for
mediating labor disputes);
* It moved both Congress and the President to intervene; and
* It marked the first time that owners used replacement players
during a labor dispute.
Fans reacted strongly to the use of replacement players. On one side
were those who felt the owners might finally succeed in ruining the game
by passing off scabs and scrubs as major leaguers. On the other side were
those who could not muster sympathy for men who were paid millions of
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dollars to play a game.
The Maryland General Assembly ("the
Assembly") counted itself among the former group.
In March 1995, the Assembly stepped up to the plate and drove home
legislation designed to prevent replacement players from playing baseball
in Oriole Park at Camden Yards ("Camden Yards"). The Assembly rallied
behind a statute that prohibited teams from playing in Camden Yards if
fewer than seventy-five percent of their players had been on major league
rosters in 1994.1 The Assembly, however, may have been thrown out at
home in its zeal to score a victory for taxpayers and fans. It committed
two errors in judgment by testing the strong arms of the federal labor law
2
and the Contract Clause of the Constitution.
This Comment analyzes why and how Financial Institution
section 13-723 ("Section 13-723" or "the Statute") of the Annotated Code
of Maryland is unconstitutional because it is preempted by federal labor
law and violates the Contract Clause of the Constitution.
Part II
summarizes the 1994-95 baseball strike, providing a context for the
resulting legislation. Part III discusses Section 13-723 and the dynamics
involved in its passage. Part IV describes the National Labor Relations
Act ("NLRA" or "the Act") and its two main preemption doctrines. Part
IV also describes cases that have applied these doctrines and analyzes
Section 13-723, concluding that it runs afoul of the NLRA. Part V
discusses the Contract Clause and the pertinent cases interpreting it. Part
V also examines the Statute in light of these cases, concluding that the
Statute is off-base under the Contract Clause. Part VI concludes that it is
the job of major league baseball, not the states, to remedy its labor woes.
II. BACKGROUND OF THE 1994-95 BASEBALL STRIKE

In December 1992, major league baseball owners voted to reopen
negotiations on their collective bargaining agreement with the Major
League Players Association.3 The agreement, which was to expire at the
end of the 1994 season, allowed either side to reopen negotiations one year
early to discuss only two issues: free agency and salaries. 4 Owners
reopened negotiations because they wanted a "new economic system" 5 that

1. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text, arguing that this legislation was, in
effect, a total ban on replacements.
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
3. Ross Newhan, Baseball Owners Open Doorto Talks, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1992, at C 1.
4. Id. at C5.
5. Ross Newhan, Owners Pushfor Salary Cap, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 18, 1993, at C8.
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tied a cap on player salaries 6to a new revenue-sharing plan between the
large and small-market teams.
At the time they reopened negotiations, the twenty-eight major
league clubs shared all revenues from national broadcast coverage and
other revenues from local broadcast coverage. Additionally, home teams
shared a percentage of their gate receipts with visiting clubs. 7 The teams
shared these funds because of the huge disparity in local broadcast
revenues. For example, the New York Yankees had a twelve-year, $486
million contract with the Madison Square Garden Network, while the
Minnesota Twins collected only about $4 million per year in local
television revenues. 8 Theoretically, this income disparity made the smallmarket clubs less competitive because they could not simultaneously sign
9
high-priced talent and remain profitable.
The new revenue-sharing plan proposed by club owners provided
each club with approximately $18 million. This money came from
national and local broadcast income, shares of ticket sales, licensing, and
indemnification from the cable TV superstations. 10 Owners linked
revenue-sharing to a salary cap because salaries had skyrocketed over the
last twenty years, 1 ' consuming a greater percentage of gross revenues than
they had previously. 12 The Players Association agreed that the clubs
should review their revenue-sharing plan but argued that the owners
should implement the new system and measure its progress before
insisting that the players restrict their salaries to help ensure the plan's
success. 13

From the time the owners voted to reopen negotiations, they took six
months to agree to consider some sort of revenue-sharing, 14 thirteen
months to approve a revenue plan, 15 and eighteen months to present a
16
proposal for a new collective bargaining agreement to the players.

6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Owners Vow Not to Lock Out Players, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Aug. 13, 1993, at C1.

9. Ross Newhan, Share and Share Alike?, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 5, 1993, at CI.
10. Id.at C5.

11. The average player's salary rose from $34,092 in 1972 to $1.12 million in 1993.
Richard Justice, BaseballFaces Strike, Again, WASH. POST, June 12, 1994, at Al.
12. Salaries comprised 58% of gross revenues in 1993 compared to 41% in 1989. Newhan,
supra note 9, at C5.

13. Id.
14. Hal Bodley, Labor Strife PlacesRaces in Jeopardy, USA TODAY, July 27, 1993, at IC.

15. Baseball Owners OK Revenue Sharing Plan, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 19, 1994, at DI.
16. Richard Justice, Baseball Proposes Salary Cap, WASH. POST, June 15, 1994, at D1.
The Players Association complained about the delay in receiving the proposal. "[I]f it takes [the
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Waiting for a proposal, the Players Association threatened strikes in
consecutive seasons. In 1993, a strike was avoided when owners pledged
not to lock out players nor to change the free agency and salary arbitration
systems before the 1994 season. 17 The union struck in August 1994 after
it could not convince owners to drop the idea of a salary cap. 18 The
Players Association did not persuade the owners to acknowledge that the
game was more prosperous than the owners had claimed, even though
revenue had increased from $185 million in 1976 to $1.8 billion in 1993.19
Unfortunately, the strike occurred during a remarkable season in
which teams long mired in the cellar seemed destined to rise and decadesold records seemed ready to fall. The first-place New York Yankees had a
chance to end that franchise's longest post-season drought of thirteen
years. The Cleveland Indians were having their best season since winning
the pennant in 1954. Tony Gwynn of the San Diego Padres had a chance
to become the first .400 hitter since Ted Williams hit .406 fifty-three years
earlier. Matt Williams, Ken Griffey, Jr., and Frank Thomas each had a
chance to break Roger Maris' single-season home run record of sixty-one,
20
which had stood for thirty-four years.
Frustration and concern with the situation eventually reached the
federal government. In June 1994, Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum
introduced a bill that would have removed baseball's antitrust exemption
on labor issues. 2 1 During the strike, Secretary of Labor Robert Reich met
with the owner's negotiator, Richard Ravitch; union head Donald Fehr met
with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. 2 2 No degree of
prodding helped. Negotiations went nowhere, time ran out, and the
23
remainder of the season, including the World Series, was cancelled.
In late September, Baltimore Oriole majority owner Peter Angelos
met with Mr. Fehr informally to discuss possible options to end the

owners] eight months or more to make a proposal, how do they expect us to study it, respond to
it and negotiate it in only a couple months?" Newhan, supra note 9, at C5.
17. Owners Vow Not to Lock out Players,supra note 8, at C1.
18. Ross Newhan, Owners Gripe as Baseball Strike Begins, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 12, 1994, at
Al.
19. Richard Justice, Strike All But Certain,WASH. POST, July 19, 1994, at El.
20. And That's the Ballgame, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Sept. 15, 1994, at IC.
21. Tom Diemer, CongressionalAction Unlikely ifBaseball Players Strike, THE PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland), July 14, 1994, at 3D. Senator Metzenbaum hoped that removing the
antitrust exemption would give the players additional leverage by enabling them to take the
owners to court if negotiations reached an impasse. Id.
22. Players Walk, Negotiators Talk, Fans Sulk, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Aug.
13, 1994, at 1C.
23. And That's the Ballgame, supra note 20, at IC.
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strike. 24 The owners formally modified their salary cap proposal in midNovember, adding a taxation proposal that would have transferred revenue
from large-market to small-market teams. 25 In early December, players
offered a counterproposal calling for a payroll tax that would raise $35
million for redistribution to small-market clubs. 26 On December 23, 1994,
the owners rejected all union proposals, declared an impasse in
negotiations, and unilaterally imposed a salary cap. 2 7 Within days, both
sides filed unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations
28
Board ("NLRB").
In January 1995, owners, who had earlier threatened to use
replacement players in place of striking players, 29 developed and approved
a plan for using replacement players. Each team would have a thirty-twoman roster; clubs would honor the contracts of those major league players
30
who broke union rank to join in replacement games.
In February 1995, under pressure from the NLRB, the owners
voluntarily withdrew the salary cap. In return, the NLRB promised not to
issue any complaints. 3 1 The union then lifted the ban on player signings it
had imposed in response to the salary cap. 32 The owners, however,
33
imposed their own ban on negotiating with and signing players,
prompting the Players Association once again to file an unfair labor
34
practice charge with the NLRB.

24. Ross Newhan, Owners Request More Time, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 5, 1994, at C3.
25. Mark Maske, Baseball Impasse JeopardizesStart of '95 Season, WASH. POST, Nov. 29,
1994, at El. Owners hoped the proposal would help bring ensure profitability, reduce the share

of club revenues going to players, and remedy payroll disparity between clubs.

Owners

Respond Coolly to Union Offer, ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Dec. 11, 1994, at 30B.
26. Owners Respond Cooly to Union Offer, supra note 25, at 30B.
27. Owners Impose Salary Cap, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 23, 1994, at GI.
28. Mark Maske, Both Sides File Charges with NLRB, WASH. POST, Dec. 28, 1994, at CI.

29. Players to Fans-Focuson the Issues, S.F. CHRON., Sept. 22, 1994, at B5.
30. Mark Maske, Replacement Rules Approved, WASH. POST, Jan. 14, 1995, at HI0

[hereinafter Maske, Replacement Rules]. There were rumors on the owners' side that up to 20%
of the players would cross the picket line within a few weeks of Opening Day. Id. Indeed, a
week before spring training was to start, several players began to question the union's
bargaining approach publicly. Mark Maske, Baseball's Waiting Game: Now Both Sides Cool
Off, WASH. POST, Feb. 12, 1995, at DI [hereinafter Maske, Baseball's Waiting Game].
31. Maske, Baseball's Waiting Game, supra note 30, at D7.

32. Id. The union had explained an earlier signings ban as a way to avoid creating "two
different classes of players who signed under two different economic systems." Newhan, supra

note 24, at C3.
33. Maske, Baseball's Waiting Game, supra note 30, at D7.
34. Silverman v. Major League Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246,
250 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 67 F.3d 1054 (2d Cir. 1995). It was upon this charge that the district
court issued an injunction against the owners, a move that triggered the end of the strike.
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With spring training fast approaching, President Clinton attempted to
provide relief by calling both sides to the White House. 35 After those talks
broke down, the President pitched legislation to Congress designed to
36
settle the strike, but Congress was reluctant to take a swing.
When spring training camps opened with replacements, 37 chaos and
confusion were the order of the day. Union unrest was apparent, though
players professed their solidarity was intact. 38 Ownership also had its
problems. Detroit Tiger manager Sparky Anderson was put on leave of
absence for refusing to manage replacement players, forfeiting a reported
$1 million salary. 39 The Toronto Blue Jays, defending World Series
champions, were a team without a province because of an Ontario law that
prohibited workers from crossing picket lines.40
Nothing, however, matched what was occurring in Baltimore, where
the Orioles simply refused to field a team of replacement players. 4 1
Orioles owner Peter Angelos, a labor lawyer, called the decision to use
replacements "ill-conceived, ill-advised, bizarre, ludicrous, [and]
unconscionable." 42 As if to echo the sentiment, the Baltimore City
Council passed an ordinance in early March prohibiting replacement
players from playing at Camden Yards and imposing a $1000 fine for each
day the ordinance was violated. 43
Against this backdrop, the State of Maryland decided to act. 44
35. Mark Maske, Clinton Seeks Intervention on Strike, WASH. POST, Feb. 8, 1995, at Al.
36. Helen Dewar, Hill Balks at Clinton Baseball Bill; Measure Would Create Panel of 3
Arbitrators, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 1995, at AI.
37. Bill McAllister, Reluctantly, Congress Takes a Swing at Strike, WASH. POST, Feb. 16,
1995, at BI.
38. Mark Maske, Dykstra Says He Won't Cross Line, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at CI.
39. Sparky Won't Coach Replacements, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 18, 1995, at B2. Anderson,
considered one of baseball's all-time great managers, was fourth on the career victory list for
managers and the only manager to have won World Series titles and 100 games or more in a
season in both leagues.
40. Tony DeMarco, Strike May Leave Jays Without a Country, DENVER POST, Feb. 5,
1995, at lB.
41. Id. at 7B.
42. Pat Jordan, Whaddya Mean No Man Is an Island?, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 26, 1995
(Magazine), at 12.
43. BALTIMORE, MD., CITY CODE art. 21, § 12 (1983 Replacement Volume, as amended).
44. Shortly after Maryland passed its statute, District Judge Sonia Sotomayor found
reasonable cause to believe the owners had committed an unfair labor practice and issued an
injunction restoring the status quo terms of the expired agreement. Silverman v. Major League
Baseball Player Relations Comm., Inc., 880 F. Supp. 246, 250 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 67 F.3d 1054
(2d Cir. 1995). The Players Association then offered to end the strike. Mark Maske, Baseball
Players Offer to End Strike, WASH. POST, Apr. 1, 1995, at Al. The owners, unable to garner
enough votes for a lock-out, accepted the offer, and the longest and most costly strike in sports
history was over. Ross Newhan, It's Now Official: Baseball to Return, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3,
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III. LEGISLATION
The Maryland General Assembly prohibited replacement players
from playing in Camden Yards for the 1995 season:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subtitle, the
[Maryland Stadium] Authority shall prohibit a major league
professional baseball team from playing baseball in a stadium in
Camden Yards if fewer than [seventy-five percent] of the
players on the team's current [forty]-player major league roster
were on the [forty]-player major league roster of a professional
team in major league baseball at any time in the preceding
45
calendar year.
This legislation was "an emergency measure ... necessary for the
immediate preservation of the public health and safety."'46 It contained a
provision that abrogated the statute on March 31, 1996, with no further
47
action required of the legislature.
In the preamble to Section 13-723, the Assembly set out its official
reasons for enacting the legislation. It stated that Camden Yards involved
a significant expenditure of State funds, that a significant debt arising from
construction costs remained, and that reducing the debt depended on public
use of the stadium. 4 8 The Assembly cited a poll stating that an
overwhelming majority of Oriole season ticket holders would not be
interested in attending games using replacement players. 4 9 Finally, the
Assembly asserted that the State had a compelling interest in protecting its
substantial investment in the stadium.5 0
There were also unofficial reasons for enacting the legislation.
Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke felt the City had a "substantial interest in
major-league baseball being played ... and replacement games are not

1995, at Al.
45. MD. CODE ANN., FiN. INST. § 13-723(b) (1992 & Supp. 1995) (abrogated Mar. 31,

1996).
46. S. 719, Regular Sess., 1995 Md. Laws 6.
47. Id. Though the statute is no longer in effect, nothing prevents Maryland or other states
from enacting similar statutes in the future. At the time this Comment went to press, owners and
players had yet to reach a new collective bargaining agreement. Moreover, the issue of state
regulation of industrial relations continues to be a live topic, not restricted to the friendly
confines of baseball. To borrow a phrase from the mootness doctrine, the situation is "capable
of repetition, yet evading review." Super Tire Eng'g Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125
(1974) (citations omitted).
48. S. 719, Regular Sess., 1995 Md. Laws 6.
49. Id.

50. Id.
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major league baseball. '5 1 The City also felt that the "future economic
benefits of major league baseball require[d] protection of the fans'
interests and loyalty. ' 52 Governor Parris Glendening said the bill was
"extremely important to doing what we can to have real baseball in
Maryland. ' 53 Other proponents hoped the bill would provide cover for
Oriole owner Peter Angelos, whose refusal to field replacement players
irked the other owners. 54 Still others argued it would help preserve Cal
55
Ripken's streak of consecutive games played.

51. Peter Schmuck et al., Mayor, Council May Try to Ban Replacements, BALT. SUN, Jan.
28, 1995, at IC. The idea of banning replacement players originated in Mayor Schmoke's
office. Charles Babington, A Conflict over Interests, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1995, at Al.
Unable to sponsor the bill himself, Mayor Schmoke asked the chairman of the Baltimore
delegation to the Assembly, State Senator John A. Pica, Jr., to sponsor it. Peter Brush, 4 Who
Got Angelos Campaign Donations PushedLegislation That May Help Him, BALT. SUN, Apr. 1,
1995, at 4B. Senator Pica worked for Peter Angelos' law firm at the time. Babington, supra.
The possible conflict of interest prompted Delegate Robert Flanagan to delay temporarily
passage of the measure so that the ethics panel could review it. That move so enraged Senator
Pica that he attempted to confront Delegate Flanagan on the House floor; unfortunately, he
mistakenly accosted another delegate, who then claimed to have been "physically threatened."
Senator Pica later said he would "knock [Flanagan's] lights out when I see him." Id.
Mayor Schmoke also threw out the first pitch on a City ordinance banning replacement
players from Camden Yards. Schmuck, supra. Interestingly, this ordinance was similar to City
Council Bill No. 1077, which would have authorized the City "to prohibit the use of
Letter from Neal M. Janey, City Solicitor,
replacement workers for professional athletes ....
City of Baltimore, to Honorable President and Members of the City Council of Baltimore I
(Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles EntertainmentLaw Journal). The City
Solicitor concluded that Council Bill No. 1077 would be preempted by federal law, id. at 5, and
would subject the City to damages and attorneys fees in favor of the major league owners if they
successfully challenged the bill in court. Id. at 5 n.3.
52. Professional Baseball-Camden Yards: Hearing on S 719 Before the Maryland
Senate Fin. Comm., Gen. Assembly of 1995, Regular Sess. (Md. 1995) (statement of Kevin
O'Keefe, representing the Baltimore City Administration).
53. John A. Morris et al., Bill on Duck Hunting Goes to Governor, BALT. SUN, Mar. 28,
1995, at 3B.
54. Michael Abramowitz, Maryland Senate Panel Considers Going to Bat for Orioles,
WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 1995, at D3.
The reasons behind Angelos' refusal to hire replacements range from his dislike for
acting commissioner Bud Selig to his admiration for the working man. Jordan, supra note 42, at
14, 16.
Angelos characterized Selig's methods for resolving baseball's problems as
"amateurish, ineffective, and doomed to failure. Watching him is like watching a person put his
hand in a buzz saw. You want to shout, 'You're splattering blood all over the rest of us!' "
Conversely, Angelos credits the labor movement "for everything good in America." He
believes it is every American's responsibility "to buy American, even if it's inferior to a foreign
product. You have to support your fellow Americans." Angelos literally practices what he
preaches: his law firm has handled product-liability cases for employees and has represented
steelworkers, shipyard workers, and other employees in a consolidated-action asbestospoisoning suit, which so far has earned nearly $1 billion for the workers. Id.
55. Abramowitz, supra note 54, at D3.
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IV. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT
The National Labor Relations Act 5 6 establishes the right of
employees to self-organize, bargain collectively, and designate
representatives to negotiate the terms and conditions of their
employment. 57 In providing this comprehensive federal regulation of
industrial relations, Congress did not simultaneously foreclose state power
to regulate industrial relations. 58 In fact, Congress has left "much to the
states, though [it] has refrained from telling us how much. ' '59 Due to this
ambiguity, the extent to which federal labor law preempts various state
laws has been a matter of frequent concern. 60 Responding to this concern,
the Supreme Court has set forth two distinct NLRA preemption doctrines,
61
known as the Garmon and Machinists doctrines.
A. Garmon Preemption Doctrine
The initial labor preemption doctrine was set forth in San Diego
Building Trades Council v. Garmon.62 The Garmon Court stated that
when "the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by
[section 7 of the Act], or constitute an unfair labor practice under [section]
8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must
yield. '63 This doctrine was further developed to preempt state action if the
56. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994)).
57. National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157.
58. This was not an oversight. As one scholar has noted:
The 1935 Congress had enough worries about whether the NLRA's core
regulatory scheme would survive a challenge that it was unconstitutionally
usurping state prerogatives, without needlessly enlarging that risk by ousting the
states from parallel jurisdiction that did not in fact conflict with the federal
scheme. Existing Supreme Court decisions in 1935, with which Congress was
intimately familiar as it considered the Wagner Act, created serious doubt that the
Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate the labor relations of
employers (other than interstate carriers) at all.
Michael H. Gottesman, Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating
Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355, 385 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
59. Garner v. Teamsters Local Union No. 776, 346 U.S. 485, 488 (1953).
60. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 241 (1959).
61. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,498-99 (1983).
62. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). At issue in Garmon was whether California could award
damages arising out of union activity that it could not enjoin. Id. at 239.
63. Id. at 244. Section 7 of the NLRA protects three employee rights: (1) the right to selforganization, (2) the right to bargain collectively, and (3) the right to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of bargaining collectively. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act,
ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169, § 157
(1994)). Section 8 defines five unfair labor practices of an employer: (1) interfering with
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conduct "is actually or arguably either prohibited or protected by the
Act." 64 The Garmon Court noted two limited exceptions to preemption:
where the regulated activity (1) was "a merely peripheral concern" of
federal labor law or (2) "touched interests ... deeply rooted in local
'6 5
feeling and responsibility.
B. Machinists PreemptionDoctrine
The second labor preemption doctrine was set forth in Lodge 76,
International Ass 'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin
Employment Relations Commission.66 A state law may be preempted
under Machinists if either of two conditions is met. First, a state law is
preempted if "Congress intended that the conduct involved be unregulated
because [it was] left 'to be controlled by the free play of economic
forces.' ' 67 Second, a state law is preempted when "'the exercise of
plenary state authority to curtail or entirely prohibit self-help would
68
frustrate effective implementation of the Act's processes."'
C. Applying the Preemption Doctrinesto Section 13-723
The Supreme Court has held that "the NLRA was intended to
supplant labor regulation, not all legitimate state activity that affects
labor." 69 In practice, this means that labor law preemption doctrines apply
only when a state or local government acts as a regulator, not when it acts
70
as a proprietor or market participant.
The Maryland Attorney General argued that Section 13-723 was not
preempted because the State was acting in a proprietary capacity as owner
employees in the exercise of their § 7 rights, (2) interfering with the formation of a union, (3)
discriminating with regard to hiring or tenure of employment, (4) retaliating against an
employee for activities under the Act, and (5) refusing to bargain. National Labor Relations Act
§ 8(1)-(5), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1)-(5).
64. Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498.
65. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243-44.
66. 427 U.S. 132 (1976). The question in Machinists was "whether federal labor policy
pre-emptled] the authority of a state labor relations board to ...[enjoin] a union and its
members from [refusing] to work overtime pursuant to a union policy to put economic pressure
on the employer in negotiations for renewal of an expired collective-bargaining agreement." Id.
at 133.
67. Id. at 140 (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971)).
68. Id. at 147-48 (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
380 (1969)).
69. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507
U.S. 218, 227 (1993).
70. Id.; see discussion infra Parts IV.C.1-2 on the proprietor/regulator distinction.
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of Camden Yards. 7 1 In a letter to several Maryland legislators, the
Attorney General's office identified the Garmon and Machinists
preemption doctrines and stated that if the legislation was viewed as
regulatory "there is no doubt that [it] is preempted under the Machinists
principle." 72 Nevertheless, the Attorney General concluded the legislation
arguably would not be preempted because Maryland, as owner of Camden
Yards, was acting in a proprietary capacity. 73 The first question, then, is:
Was Maryland acting as a regulator or proprietor in enacting the Statute?
1. The Distinction Between Proprietor and Regulator
Three Supreme Court cases are instructive in delineating
proprietary/regulatory conduct. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los
75
Angeles74 and Wisconsin Department of Industry v. Gould Inc.
demonstrate what type of state action constitutes regulation; Building &
76
Construction Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors,Inc.
is an example of a state acting as a proprietor. Maryland's actions are
closely analogous to the regulatory actions in Golden State Transit and
Gould but dissimilar to the proprietary action in Building & Construction
Trades Council.
Golden State Transit involved Los Angeles' refusal to renew a
taxicab franchise because the company's drivers were on strike. 77 The
Supreme Court rejected the contention that the City was simply making a
decision concerning a taxicab franchise and not regulating it.78 The Court
held that the parties' use of economic pressure was "a legitimate part of
71. Maryland legislators sought the opinion of the Maryland Attorney General because
they were aware there may be legal objections to the bill. Letter from Richard E. Israel,
Assistant Attorney General, State of Maryland, to Samuel I. Rosenberg, Delegate, and John A.
Pica, Jr., Senator, Maryland General Assembly 5 (Feb. 21, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los

Angeles Entertainment Law Journal).
72. Id. at 3. The Attorney General expressed no view whether the bill violated Garmon.

73. Id. at 5.
74. 475 U.S. 608 (1986).

75. 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
76. 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
77. Golden State Transit, 475 U.S. at 609. Drivers went on strike while the company was
up for franchise renewal with the City. Initially, the City Council extended the contract several
times while labor negotiations continued. 1d. at 610. Later, Council members publicly accused
the company of negotiating unreasonably and attempting to break the union. Id. at 611. The
Council ultimately rejected a final contract extension and stated it would not reconsider unless
the parties settled the dispute before the contract expired. Id. When the parties did not settle
and the franchise expired, the company sued, alleging the City's action was preempted by the

NLRA. id.
78. Id. at 618.
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their collective-bargaining process.... [T]he bargaining process was
thwarted when the city in effect imposed a positive durational limit on the
exercise of economic self-help." 79 The situation might have been different
if the City had purchased services from the company for use by City
workers.8 0
"In that situation, if the strike had produced serious
interruptions in the services the city had purchased, the city would not
necessarily have been pre-empted from advising Golden State that it would
hire another company if the labor dispute were not resolved and services
resumed by a specific deadline." 8 1 Had Los Angeles acted as a market
participant, protecting its interests as a consumer of services rather than
regulating a company, its action might have survived a preemption
challenge.
In Gould,82 Wisconsin did not inject itself into a labor dispute but
instead prohibited its procurement agents from doing business with any
person who had violated the NLRA three times within five years. 83 The
Supreme Court rejected the assertion that the statute was an exercise of the
State's spending, rather than its regulatory power. 84 The Court determined
that the purposes of the statute were to deter labor law violations and
enforce the NLRA. 85 "[A]s a supplemental sanction for violations of the
NLRA, [the statute] conflicts with the [NLRB's] comprehensive regulation
of industrial relations ... [,] diminishes the Board's control over
enforcement of the NLRA[,] and thus further detracts from the 'integrated
scheme of regulation' created by Congress. '86 The Court emphasized a
limit to its holding:
We do not say that state purchasing decisions may never be
influenced by labor considerations .... [However, we] are not
faced here with a statute that can even plausibly be defended as
a legitimate response to state procurement constraints or to local
economic needs, or with a law that pursues a task Congress
intended to leave to the States. The manifest purpose and
inevitable effect of the debarment rule is to enforce the
79. Id. at 615 (citation omitted).
80. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 227.
81. Id. at 227-28.
82. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986).
83. Id. at 283-84. Following judicial enforcement of four NLRB orders against various
Gould divisions, Wisconsin informed the company that it would not enter new contracts with it
for three years and would continue current contracts only as long as necessary to avoid
penalties. Id. at 285.
84. Id. at 287.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 288-89.
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requirements of the NLRA. That goal may be laudable, but it
assumes for the State of Wisconsin a role Congress reserved
87
exclusively for the [NLRB].
Conversely, Building & Construction Trades Council8 8 involved an
attempt by Massachusetts, as owner of a construction project, to enforce a
89
pre-hire collective bargaining agreement negotiated by private parties.
The Supreme Court emphasized that Congress authorized certain kinds of
labor agreements to accommodate conditions specific to the construction
industry. 90 The Court stated:
[There was] no reason to expect these defining features of the
construction industry to depend upon the public or private
nature of the entity purchasing contracting services. To the
extent that a private purchaser may choose a contractor based
upon that contractor's willingness to enter into a prehire
agreement, a public entity as purchaser should be permitted to
91
do the same.
Massachusetts' action was not preempted because it was not trying to
regulate industrial relations; it was merely purchasing labor for a
construction project it owned. As then-Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer had
noted in dissent:
[W]hen the MWRA, acting in the role of purchaser of
construction services, acts just like a private contractor would
act, and conditions its purchasing upon the very sort of labor
agreement that Congress explicitly authorized and expected
frequently to find, it does not "regulate" the workings of the
market forces that Congress expected to find; it exemplifies
92
them.
87. Id. at 291.

88. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507
U.S. 218 (1993).

89. Id. at 220. The Massachusetts Water Resources Authority ("MWRA") was responsible
for a clean-up project of Boston Harbor, providing the funds for construction of the treatment
plant, awarding contracts, and supervising the effort. Id.at 221. The project managment
company sought and received approval from the MWRA to negotiate an agreement with the
Building and Construction Trades Council ("BCTC"). The agreement recognized the BCTC as
the exclusive bargaining agent for all craft employees, required that all employees become

union members within seven days of employment, established the primary use of BCTC's hiring
halls as suppliers of the craft labor force, and required all contractors and subcontractors to
agree to be bound by the agreement. Id. at 221-22. Two contractors associations brought
separate suits alleging the agreement violated the NLRA. Id.at 222-23.

90. Id. at 231.
91. Id.
92. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Massachusetts Water Resources Auth., 935
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2. Maryland's Action Is Regulatory Rather Than Proprietary
The Maryland Attorney General's office opined that a state "has
considerable latitude when pursuing its purely proprietary interest. '93 In
addition, because Maryland owned and managed Camden Yards, "it is at
least arguable that the State is acting in its proprietary capacity like any
other property owner to protect a substantial investment which would
likely be eroded if less experienced replacement players were used." 94
Analysis shows, however, that Maryland's action closely resembled the
nonproprietary state actions in Gould and Golden State Transit.
Recall that in Gould, the statute punished companies for NLRA
violations, not for breaches of its contractual obligations to the State. 95
Similarly, Maryland did not accuse the Orioles of breaching its lease with
the Maryland Stadium Authority ("MSA"). There are no lease provisions
requiring that players be of a certain caliber, that they achieve certain
offensive or defensive milestones, or that the team attract a minimum
number of fans to the park.9 6 Maryland determined that the owners should
be restricted in their use of replacement players; Maryland did not attempt
to protect its substantial capital investment by taking any steps to ensure
large attendance except with respect to the Orioles' labor policy. Thus it

F.2d 345, 361 (1st Cir. 1991) (Breyer, C.J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom., Building & Constr.
Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507 U.S. 218 (1993).
93. Letter from Richard E. Israel, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maryland, to Samuel
I. Rosenberg, Delegate, and John A. Pica, Jr., Senator, Maryland General Assembly, supranote
71, at 4.
94. Id.
95. Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc., 507
U.S. 218, 228-29 (1993).
96. Agreement Regarding Oriole Park at Camden Yards Between the Maryland Stadium
Authority and The Orioles, Inc., Sept. 2, 1992 [hereinafter Lease Agreement] (on file with the
Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal). The Orioles' annual rent to the MSA is
partially based on admission and concession revenues. Id. art. IV, §§ 4.03.2(a), (c). A decrease
in attendance would probably cause a corresponding decrease in rent revenue to the State. As in
any contract, however, the Orioles have an obligation to act in good faith. As long as the
Orioles do not use replacement players in order to lower their rent payments, they will not have
breached the lease. Moreover, the Lease Agreement states that:
[The MSA] shall have no right to approve or veto the ORIOLES' decisions
regarding the business operations of the ORIOLES or the baseball operations of
the Baltimore Orioles. The ORIOLES shall have the sole and exclusive right to
make all such decisions in accordance with their own needs as the ORIOLES
deem appropriate, without interference from MSA ....
Id. art. IV, § 4.10.
"Business operations" are defined to include "replacing members of and maintaining the
Baltimore Orioles professional team... .'" Id. art. V, § 5.01.3(c).
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attempted to infringe upon the NLRA's "comprehensive regulation of
industrial relations" 9 7 just as Wisconsin did in Gould.
Maryland's action is also similar to Los Angeles' attempt in Golden
State Transit to use its legislative power to influence the outcome of a
labor dispute. By prohibiting replacement players from using Camden
Yards when Opening Day was only one month away, Maryland "in effect
imposed a positive durational limit on the exercise of economic selfhelp."9 8 The owners were intent on starting the season on time with either
replacement or major league players. Maryland, in essence, declared that
players would have to be major league players. 9 9 In order to start the
season on time, the owners would have to settle with the Players
Association before Opening Day.
The situation would have been different if Maryland had purchased
baseball services from the Orioles for use by State employees. Using the
language from the Court's reasoning in Building & Construction Trades
Council:
[I]f the strike had produced serious interruptions in the [major
league baseball] services the [State] had purchased, the [State]
would not necessarily have been preempted from advising [the
Orioles] that it would hire another [major league baseball team]
if the labor dispute were not resolved and [major league
baseball] services resumed by [the start of the season].1 00
Of course, Maryland does not have a baseball services contract with
the Orioles or major league baseball. The State is not a consumer that has
hired the Orioles to entertain State employees; the State is merely leasing
its stadium to the Orioles.
The Maryland General Assembly emphasized that it was protecting
its substantial investment as would any property owner.101 This argument
has some merit and judicial support. It may be too much to ask a state to
stand by helplessly while a labor impasse wreaks havoc on its economy.
Data suggested that the use of replacement players would threaten
Maryland's investment in Camden Yards. 102 Additionally, several courts
97. Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282, 288 (1986).
98. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 615 (1986).
99. See infra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
100. Building & Constr. Trades Council, 507 U.S. at 227-28.

101. S. 719, Regular Sess., 1995 Md. Laws 6.
102. Memorandum from Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., Survey of Baltimore
Orioles Season Ticket Holders, to Peter Angelos 1-5 (Jan. 20, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of

Los Angeles EntertainmentLaw Journal). This survey concludes that the Orioles would suffer
serious damage to its fan base if it began the season with replacement players. Thirty percent of
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have implied that the existence of local economic needs may have changed
03
their finding of preemption. 1
However, there is one fundamental problem with this argument. No
court has held that the possibility of local economic harm transforms a
state from a regulator to a proprietor. That argument is properly used only
to show that the state regulation is excused under the Garmon "local
feeling" exception. 104 Generally, state governments that attempt to
regulate industrial relations do not try to escape preemption by portraying
themselves as market participants. They attempt to bring their regulations
within the Garmon exceptions. 105 Because Maryland is not purchasing
baseball services, it is acting as a regulator and should be subject to the
preemption doctrines. Arguments regarding harm to the local economy
may properly be advanced only under the Garmon exceptions.
3. Preemption Overview
Since Maryland acted as a regulator and not a proprietor, the
preemption doctrines apply to Section 13-723.
The Garmon and
Machinists preemption doctrines are different roads to the same
destination. A particular state action need not violate both doctrines in
order to be preempted by the NLRA. The Maryland Statute exemplifies
this principle. On the one hand, Section 13-723 does not violate Garmon
because it does not interfere with the NLRB's interpretation or
enforcement of the NLRA. 106 On the other hand, Section 13-723 does
violate Machinists because it curtails self-help remedies. 10 7 Finally, the
Garmon preemption exceptions do not save the Statute, as will be shown

the respondents said that if replacements were used, thus ending Cal Ripken's streak of
consecutive games played, it would affect their long-term feelings toward the team. Id. at 1, 5.
103. The Gould Court said that the Wisconsin statute could not "plausibly be defended as a
legitimate response ... to local economic needs .... Wisconsin Dep't of Indus. v. Gould Inc.,
475 U.S. 282, 291 (1986). The court stated in Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland
that the city's boycott of the newspaper "in no way helps the city.... Indeed, the city is hurt by
its own action." 860 F. Supp. 1428, 1433 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (holding that a city resolution
cancelling the city's newspaper advertising and subscriptions and endorsing a union boycott of a
newspaper was preempted). It is plausible that the economic harm Maryland portended in its
statute could have occurred. If the survey results were accurate and fans stayed away from
Camden Yards, tax revenues from ticket, parking, and concessions sales would have been lower
than expected. The statute might have helped both the state and local economies.
104. See supra Part IV.A.
105. International Paper Co. v. Town of Jay, 928 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1991); NLRB v.
Florida, 868 F.2d 391,394-95 (11 th Cir. 1989).
106. See infra Part IV.C.3.a.
107. See infra Part IV.C.3.b.
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through several cases in which courts have permitted a state to regulate
08
labor under its police powers in the name of public safety.1
a. Applying Garmon to Section 13-723
Garmon prohibits state or local governments from regulating
activities that the NLRA actually or arguably either protects or
prohibits. 109 Section 13-723 does not violate Garmon because it does not
regulate conduct that the NLRA protects under section 7 or prohibits under
section 8. Two cases help clarify this concept.
In Garmon, a California court awarded damages to an employer for
losses sustained due to union picketing. 1 0 The damage award was based
on the California Supreme Court's holding that the union's conduct
constituted an unfair labor practice."' 1 However, the United States
Supreme Court held that the NLRB had exclusive power to determine if an
activity was an unfair labor practice, i.e., prohibited by section 8.112
California's action was preempted because it sought to award damages for
an activity over which the NLRB had sole jurisdiction. 113
114
The second case, Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers,
involved Minnesota's Striker Replacement Law, 115 which made it an
unfair labor practice for an employer to hire permanent replacement
workers during a strike or lockout. The Employers Association argued
that the law did not distinguish between hiring permanent replacements for
an economic or unfair labor practice strike; therefore, the law simply
restated well-settled federal labor law. 116 However, the district court noted
that the law violated Garmon because only the NLRB may declare what
constitutes an unfair labor practice.'1

108. See infra Part IV.C.3.d.

109. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959); see also
Belknap,
110.
111.
112.
113.

Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491,498 (1983).
Garmon, 359 U.S. at 237-38.
Id. at 238. The NLRB had earlier declined to exercise its jurisdiction in the case. Id.
Id. at 245.
Id. at 246.

114. 803 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Minn. 1992), vacated, 19 F.3d 405 (8th Cir.), vacated and
supersededper curiam, 23 F.3d 214 (8th Cir.), affd, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994).
115. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.12 (West 1996). The statute states that it is an unfair labor
practice "[t]o grant or offer to grant the status of permanent replacement employee to a person

for performing bargaining unit work for an employer during a lockout of employees in a labor
organization or during a strike of employees in a labor organization authorized by a
representative of employees[.]" Id. § 179.12(9).
116. Employers Ass'n, 803 F. Supp. at 1566.
117. Id.
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These cases demonstrate that the purpose of Garmon is to preserve
the NLRB's unique role of interpreting and enforcing the NLRA. 1 18 The
Maryland statute does not attempt to interpret or enforce the NLRA.
Although Maryland may have thought that the owners' threat to use
replacement players was "unfair" to the union, the fans, and the State, that
conduct did not constitute an unfair labor practice under the NLRA. Thus,
Garmon does not preempt the Statute because it does not regulate any
activity that is protected or prohibited by the NLRA.
b. Applying Machinists to Section 13-723
Machinists does not allow a state to regulate conduct that Congress
l 9
intended to be "controlled by the free play of economic forces.""
Furthermore, Machinists prohibits state action that curtails self-help
remedies if doing so frustrates implementation of the NLRA. 120 The
Supreme Court has approved hiring replacement workers for strikers as a
self-help remedy. 12 1 Courts have consistently held that statutes curtailing
118. Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608, 613 (1986).
119. Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 140 (1976) (quoting NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138,
144 (1971)).
120. Id.at 147-48 (quoting Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369,
380 (1969)).
121. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345 (1938). Although this has
been the law since 1938, it is still extremely controversial. As one scholar has written, "few
rules of American labor law have been as heavily criticized as the legality of hiring permanent
strike replacements." Paul Weiler, Striking New Balance: Freedom of Contract and the
Prospectsfor Union Representation, 98 HARv. L. REv. 351, 393 (1984).
The argument against the Mackay Radio replacement rule covers three bases. First, the
Court's pronouncement of this "rule" was contained in dicta. Mackay Radio, 304 U.S. at 345.
The NLRB did not argue that Mackay could not replace its strikers; it merely claimed that the
discriminatory manner in which it reinstated some of the strikers was an unfair labor practice.
Id. at 346. Thus, the rule the Court announced was not based on any issue in controversy.
Second, although the intent of the NLRA is to prevent employers from firing workers in reprisal
for going on strike, Mackay Radio allows employers to replace strikers permanently. Weiler,
supra, at 390. The possibility of a worker losing her job because of a strike is likely to chill her
willingness to exercise her statutory right to strike. Id.Third, in passing the NLRA, Congress
was silent on the issue of permanent replacements. In fact, during the past several years,
Congress has attempted to overturn Mackay Radio by legislation, but filibusters have killed the
efforts. 138 CONG. REC. S8237-03 (daily ed. June 16, 1992); 140 CONG. REC. S8844-03 (daily
ed. July 13, 1994). President Clinton showed his displeasure with hiring permanent
replacements by issuing an executive order banning federal government agencies from
contracting with employers who permanently replace striking employees. Exec. Order No.
12,954, 60 Fed. Reg. 13,023 (1995). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
held that the NLRA preempted that order. Chamber of Commerce v. Reich, 74 F.3d 1322 (D.C.
Cir.), petitionfor reh 'g denied, 83 F.3d 439 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The administration subsequently
decided not to pursue an appeal to the Supreme Court. White House Won't Push for Striker
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self-help remedies are preempted by the NLRA. 122 The following two
cases exemplify these holdings.
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of Boston 123 evaluated
a challenge to a Boston ordinance that prohibited the hiring of replacement
workers in general and the recruitment or hiring of replacement workers
specifically when there was a likely threat to public safety. 124 The district
court found that hiring replacements was a legitimate economic weapon.
the use of this
As a result, the court held that an ordinance penalizing
12 5
doctrine.
Machinists
the
weapon was preempted under
In Alameda Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Oakland,126 the AFL-CIO
was boycotting the Oakland Tribune. The City enacted a resolution
endorsing the boycott and urging citizens to stop purchasing and
advertising in the paper. 12 7 The City also cancelled its advertising in, and
subscriptions to, the paper. 128 The paper sued, claiming the resolution was
preempted by the NLRA. 129 The district court held that Machinists clearly
preempted the resolution. 130 The court wrote:
The city's resolution attempts to coerce plaintiff through
economic and public pressure, and that is legislative activity
that is preempted by Machinists. By cancelling their
subscriptions and advertisements, and by encouraging the
citizens of Oakland to do the same, the city has changed the
economic balance of the parties to the labor dispute, and has
thereby restricted plaintiffs use of its economic rights vis 6 vis
Replacement Ban, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1996, at D2.
These arguments question the origin and legitimacy of Mackay Radio. It may very well
be that Congress will one day ban replacement workers. Under that circumstance, Maryland
will have been vindicated. Until that occurs, however, employers, including major league
baseball owners, will be allowed to hire replacement workers, following the rule of Mackay
Radio and its "unvarying progeny." Employers Ass 'n, 803 F. Supp. at 1565 n.9.
122. See, e.g., Employers Ass'n v. United Steelworkers, 803 F. Supp. 1558 (D. Minn.
1992), vacated, 19 F.3d 405 (8th Cir.), vacated and supersededper curiam, 23 F.3d 214 (8th
Cir.), affid, 32 F.3d 1297 (8th Cir. 1994); Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce v. City of
Boston, 778 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1991); Charlesgate Nursing Ctr. v. Rhode Island, 723 F.
Supp. 859 (D.R.I. 1989).
123. 778 F. Supp. 95 (D. Mass. 1991).
124. Id. at 96.
125. Id. at 97.
126. 860 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
127. Id. at 1430.
128. Id. at 1430-31.

129. Id. at 1431. The court first rejected the idea that the City was merely acting as a
proprietor, finding the City was not a party to the collective bargaining agreement and had no
proprietary interest in the terms of the agreement. Id. at 1432.

130. Id. at 1434.
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the unions. The city has put its thumb on the balance scale
between management and labor in a private industry, which a
13 1
local government may not do.
Section 13-723 does not prohibit hiring replacement players, but its
practical effect is to prevent teams from using replacement players in place
of striking players. The Statute prohibits teams from playing at Camden
Yards "if fewer than [seventy-five percent] of the players on the team's
current [forty]-player major league roster were on the [forty]-player major
league roster ...at any time in the preceding calendar year."'1 32 Therefore,
at least thirty major league players per team would need to cross the picket
line in order for a team to play with replacements at Camden Yards.
The numeric requirement poses two problems. First, the Statute does
not contemplate rosters of any size other than forty players; however, the
clubs approved replacement player rosters of thirty-two players. 133 If we
were to ignore this reality and apply the Statute to forty-man rosters,
Section 13-723 would require major league players to comprise thirty out
of thirty-two players on the approved replacement roster (ninety-four
percent). Assume, however, that a court would attempt to save the Statute
and apply it to the approved replacement roster or any roster regardless of
size. Seventy-five percent of a thirty-two man roster would permit only
eight replacement players, and would require twenty-four major league
players.
Second, the owners were predicting that, at most, twenty percent of
major league players would cross the picket line. 134 To simplify matters,
assume that we are only dealing with the replacement roster. Twenty
percent of a thirty-two man roster equals approximately seven players. To
complete their rosters, teams would have to hire twenty-five replacement
players. Of course, if they did, they would clearly violate the Statute.
Assume further that teams would not want to violate the Statute and that
seven major league players on each team did cross the picket line. Each
team would then be able to hire only two replacement players, the Statute
thus limiting each club to nine-man rosters. 135
Because each team has nine players in the game at any given time,
there appears to be no problem with the statute. However, clubs cannot
operate with nine-player rosters. It is unusual for modem pitchers to pitch
131. Id.
132. MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST. § 13-723(b) (1992 & Supp. 1995).
133. Maske, Replacement Rules, supra note 30, at HI0.
134. Id.
135. Seven out of nine players is 78%; seven out often players is 70%, a ratio that violates
the statute.
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complete games and for position players to play in all 162 games in a
season. No team has ever played an entire season with the same eight
position players and the same four or five pitchers pitching every inning of
every game. To compound matters, the Orioles are an American League
team and use the designated hitter.' 36 Section 13-723 would require both
teams to use their entire rosters for every game at Camden Yards.
Therefore, although Section 13-723 does not prohibit hiring replacements,
it is unlikely that replacement players would ever work at Camden Yards.
Section 13-723 increased the pressure on major league baseball to
settle the strike. Because Section 13-723 was enacted about a month
before the start of the regular season, the Assembly placed a time
restriction on negotiations between owners and players.1 37 If there was no
agreement before Opening Day, baseball would not be played at Camden
Yards. Thus, the statute infringed upon the owners' self-help remedy and
violated the Machinists preemption doctrine.
c. The Garmon Exceptions to Preemption
Although Section 13-723 violates Machinists, it may survive
preemption if it falls within the two limited exceptions articulated in
Garmon: that the regulated activity was (1) a peripheral concern of the
NLRA, or (2) deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility. 138 At least
one court has applied the Garmon exceptions to determine if a statute
preempted under Machinists was still valid. In Charlesgate Nursing
Center v. Rhode Island,139 a Rhode Island statute prohibited employers
from using third parties to recruit or hire replacements for striking
workers. 140 Following a strike by nursing home workers, the nursing
home sued the State, challenging the statute's constitutionality. 14 1 The
district court held that the State could not proscribe the nursing home from

136. Long the bane of baseball traditionalists, the designated hitter (DH) rule allows
American League teams to use a tenth player to bat in the pitcher's spot in the batting order.
The DH rule has not been adopted in the National League, proving that some owners have
moments of lucidity.
137. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.

138. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1959).
139. 723 F. Supp. 859 (D.R.I. 1989). Note that when confronted with a preemption
question, the Supreme Court has found that state law either was preempted or fell within a
Garmion exception. The Court has never definitively stated that a state law that was preempted
could be saved by a Garmon exception. That is the analysis, however, that the district court in
Charlesgate used. id. at 866.
140. Id. at 860-61.
141. Id. at 861.
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using a "peaceful form of self help that is not prohibited by the NLRA"
42
unless the State could meet the Garmon exceptions.1
The court then found that the statute had more than a peripheral
impact on federal labor law because it "directly and significantly limit[ed]
the availability of one of an employer's principal economic weapons... [,]
fundamentally alter[ing] the economic balance between labor and
management envisaged by the NLRA."' 143 The court also found that the
statute did more than address local concerns, such as the prevention of
violence. 144 It emphasized that the statute did not proscribe violence; it
merely restricted an employer's right to hire replacements. 14 5 The court
ruled that the State would have to achieve its goals through means less
146
intrusive on federal rights.
It is difficult to argue that the regulations on the use of replacement
workers are merely a peripheral concern of the NLRA. The Supreme
Court has long held that an employer has a right to replace striking
workers. 147 Additionally, it is difficult to argue that the law merely
concerns local interests. Baseball, the national pastime, has annual
revenues of $1.7 billion. 148
Fourteen American League teams,
representing twelve states and two countries, 149 play ball at Camden Yards
each season.
The strike generated so much interest on Capitol Hill that Congress
members introduced bills and amendments and held hearings to remove
baseball's antitrust exemption and to establish a mediation process to
resolve the strike. 150 President Clinton also intervened several times.
First, he appointed William J. Usery, a former Secretary of Labor, to
mediate the dispute. Later, he personally met with owner and union
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Id. at 866.
Id.
Id.
Charlesgate, 723 F. Supp. at 866.
Id.
NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-46 (1938). But see supra note

121.
148. Richard Justice, Baseball Faces Strike, Again, WASH. POST, June 12, 1994, at Al.
149. California (Angels, Athletics), Illinois (White Sox), Maryland (Orioles),
Massachusetts (Red Sox), Michigan (Tigers), Minnesota (Twins), Missouri (Royals), New York
(Yankees), Ohio (Indians), Texas (Rangers), Washington (Mariners), Wisconsin (Brewers), and
Canada (Blue Jays).
150. Diemer, supra note 21, at 3D; Mark Maske, Congress Readyfor Turn at Bat; Baseball
May Lose Antitrust Exemption, WASH. PosT, Jan. 4, 1995, at FI; Manny Topol, Repeal of
Exemption GainsSome Ground,NEWSDAY, Sept. 23, 1994, at A98; Manny Topol, Taking Swing
at Exemption Subcommittee OKs Bill, NEWSDAY, Sept. 29, 1994, at A83; A Small Step by Reps
Committee Votes to Curb Exemption, NEWSDAY, Sept. 30, 1994, at A105.
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representatives at the White House in an attempt to reach a consensus.
Finally, he sent legislation to Congress that would create a panel of
arbitrators to settle the strike. 15 1 That last action was unprecedented, as no
President had ever previously sought legislation under the NLRA to end a
strike. 152 The presidential and congressional response to the baseball labor
dispute demonstrates that the strike and its effects were not isolated to the
major league baseball cities. Although the use of replacement players at
Camden Yards would uniquely affect the economies of Baltimore and
Maryland, a prohibition on their use would ripple throughout baseball and
have both national and international implications.
d. Police Powers
The Supreme Court has allowed states to regulate labor under their
police powers in the name of public safety. 153 Not surprisingly, the
Maryland General Assembly enacted the law as an emergency measure in
54
the name of public health and safety.'
The following cases set the parameters within which courts seem
willing to allow state regulation of labor under police powers. Generally,
the cases demonstrate that the laws must: (1) promote public safety; (2) be
unrelated to the collective bargaining process; and (3) involve an actual
emergency.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Massachusetts,155 the issue
was whether a Massachusetts statute, requiring minimum mental health
care benefits for insured residents, applied to insurance policies purchased
pursuant to collective bargaining agreements regulated by the NLRA.156
The Supreme Court held that the NLRA was not intended to disturb
151. Mark Maske, Usery's Deadline Extended; Baseball Mediator Will Present Plan to

President This Afternoon, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 1995, at El; Maske, supra note 35, at Al;
Dewar, supra note 36, at Al.
152. Frank Swoboda, President Treading New Ground; Congress Wonders if it Should
Follow Suit, WASH. PosT, Feb. 9, 1995, at D2. During the Korean War, President Truman

seized the nation's steel mills in response to a union notice of a nationwide strike. He believed
that the threatened work stoppages would immediately jeopardize the national defense.
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952).

153. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985). Again, it
does not appear the Court is establishing "police powers" or "public safety" as new Garmon-like
exceptions. Rather, it seems the Court groups these under the Garmon local responsibility
exception. Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly stated its position.
154. S. 719, Regular Sess., 1995 Md. Laws 6.

155. 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
156. Id. at 727. "Insured residents" are those insured under a general policy, an accident or
sickness policy, or an employee health-care plan that covered hospital and surgical expenses.
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existing state laws that set minimum labor standards and were unrelated to
the processes of bargaining or self-organization.' 57 Instead, the Court
found that Congress "developed the framework for self-organization and
collective bargaining of the NLRA within the larger body of state law
promoting public health and safety."' 158 The Court continued: "'States
possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the
employment relationship to protect workers within the State. Child labor
laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws
affecting occupational health
1 59
and safety... are only a few examples.""
InternationalPaper Co. v. Town of Jay160 involved a city ordinance
passed during a labor strike requiring (1) companies to obtain a permit
before discharging pollutants and (2) compliance with local environmental
regulations before the permit would be issued.' 6 1 International Paper
claimed the ordinance unduly restricted its bargaining power with the
union and therefore was preempted by the NLRA. 162 The First Circuit
rejected this claim, stating that no direct effect on the company's
bargaining position existed.1 63 The court added that "indirect intrusions
into collective bargaining, such as '[c]lean air and water laws, selective
cutting requirements in forest operations, industrial safety standards, [and]
tax increases,' are rarely preempted by labor statutes such as ... the
NLRA."1

64

In NLRB v. Florida,16 5 the Eleventh Circuit examined whether
Florida could require jai alai players to give fifteen days notice to the State
of Florida and the National Association of Jai Alai Frontons before
striking. 166 Florida and the fronton owners contended that the State's
police powers had authorized the State to regulate the players' conduct
16 7
because the strike would likely endanger the public health and safety.
The circuit court noted that police powers allow a state to enjoin strike
conduct only under existing emergency circumstances. 68 The court

157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.

Id. at 756.
Id.
Id. (quoting De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356 (1976)).
928 F.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1991).
Id. at 482.
Id. at 483.
Id. at 484.
Id. (citation and emphasis omitted).
868 F.2d 391 (1lth Cir. 1989).
Id. at 392.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 396.
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had not established the
agreed with the NLRB that Florida and the owners
69
1
danger:
public
imminent
or
actual
requisite
[C]ourts have strictly limited state regulation of strike conduct
to emergency situations where a strike has caused violence or
will inevitably harm the public welfare ....
... Case law clearly prohibits states from exercising their
police powers to regulate strike conduct prior to the existence of
70
actual or imminent danger or injury to the public. 1
These cases demonstrate that courts allow states to regulate labor
under their police powers as long as there is an actual threat to public
safety and the regulation does not impair the collective bargaining process.
Section 13-723, although enacted in the name of public health and safety,
clearly does not protect the public welfare in the manner envisioned by the
courts.
Although courts refer to minimum labor standards, minimum wage
laws, and occupational safety, Section 13-723 implicates none of these
criteria. Instead, the Maryland General Assembly expresses concerns
about its substantial investment and the use of replacement players, and it
equates this concern to a threat to the public welfare. Few people would
disagree with the Assembly that businesses would lose money if
replacement players were used. 17 1 However, economic harm does not
always rise to the level of a threat to public welfare. Most, if not all,
strikes have some adverse economic impact on local and state economies;
that fact alone does not give a state authority to regulate. If it did, states
could theoretically prohibit union strikes of private companies whenever
those strikes threatened economic harm.

169. Id.

170. Id; see also Division 1287, Amalgamated Ass'n of St. Employees v. Missouri, 374
U.S. 74 (1963); Charlesgate Nursing Ctr. v. Rhode Island, 723 F. Supp. 859, 866 (D.R.I. 1989).
Amalgamated involved a Missouri law that defined certain public utilities as "life essentials"
and empowered the State to regulate labor relations affecting those utilities as being necessary

to the public interest. AmalgamatedAss'n of St. Employees, 374 U.S. at 78 n.4. The Court held
a state law could not withstand a preemption challenge simply by being designated as
emergency legislation. Id. at 81-82.

171. Even some of the owners during the strike said that spring training cities could expect
games involving replacement players to generate 70% of their normal revenues. Maske, supra
note 35, at Al. Approximately one year after the strike, data indicated that attendance at major
league ballparks was down nearly 20% over 1994; 25 of 28 teams had lost more than 10% in
attendance, and two teams, Minnesota and Pittsburgh, had lost over 30%. Cheryl Phillips,
Ballpark Figures Slide; Struggling Teams Look for Late-Season FinancialRally, USA TODAY,
Aug. 11, 1995, at 3C.

148

LOYOLA OFLOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 17

Maryland termed Section 13-723 an emergency measure, but the
facts do not support that designation. There were no reports of players,
fans, fired front-office workers, advertisers, or business employees
threatening violence in Baltimore or in any other major league city if the
strike continued or if replacement players were used. Aside from the
potential for economic harm, there was no threat to the public health and
safety. Section 13-723 was a direct attempt to influence the collective
bargaining process. As such, it was preempted under the Machinists labor
law preemption doctrine and was not saved by either of the Garmon
exceptions.
V. CONTRACT CLAUSE

The Constitution provides that "[n]o State shall... pass any... Law
impairing the Obligation of Contracts."' 172 The Supreme Court has
indicated that "[t]he context in which the Contracts Clause is found, the
historical setting in which it was adopted, and our cases construing the
Clause, indicate that its primary focus was upon legislation that was
designed to repudiate or adjust pre-existing debtor-creditor relationships
that obligors were unable to satisfy."' 173 Originally, the Contract Clause
was one of the few express limitations on state power. 174 However, over
the past century, the Fourteenth Amendment has assumed a larger role in
limiting state power. 175 As a result, only a handful of Contract Clause
cases have reached the Supreme Court over the past several decades, and
most of those cases have been decided in favor of the State. 176
Nevertheless, based upon the Supreme Court's current Contract Clause
analysis, it is possible to use the Contract Clause to strike down
Section 13-723.
A. CurrentSupreme CourtAnalysis
By its plain language, the Constitution precludes any law that impairs
contractual obligations. Such a strict construction, however, would choke

172. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
173. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 502-03 (1987)
(footnote omitted).
174. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1977).
175. Id.
176. See General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181 (1992); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229
(1984); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965). But see Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
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off many state laws. In Home Building & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell,17 7 the
Supreme Court said that the Clause "is not to be read with literal exactness
like a mathematical formula."' 178 Since Blaisdell,the Court has developed
a three-part analysis for Contract Clause violations: Has there been an
impairment of contract? 179 Does the change in law substantially impair a
contractual relationship? 180 Is the state impairing the obligations of its
18 1
own contracts?
B. MarylandHas Impaireda Contract
Before there can be a contract impairment, there must be a contract.
The Supreme Court has noted that this part of the analysis is normally not
problematic, 182 and it is not problematic here. The MSA has a 30-year
lease with the Orioles that requires Camden Yards be available to the
team.

183

Having established the contractual relationship, we must next ask
whether the Statute impairs that contract. Section 13-723 prohibits a major
league baseball team, including the Orioles, from playing baseball in
Camden Yards if fewer than seventy-five percent of its players were on a
major league team in the preceding year. 184 Section 13-723 impaired such
express contractual obligations as the Orioles' day-to-day operations, 18 5

177. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
178. Id.at 428.

The Court noted five relevant factors to determine a Contract Clause

violation: (1)an emergency existed that furnished the proper occasion for the state to exercise
its power to protect the vital interests of the community; (2) the legislation addressed a
legitimate end in that it protected a basic societal interest, not particular individuals; (3) the
relief afforded was appropriate to the emergency; (4) the conditions imposed were reasonable;
and (5) the legislation was limited to the length of the emergency. Id. at 444-47. See also
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400, 410 n.11 (1983).
179. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 17; see also Romein, 503 U.S. at 186.

180. Allied StructuralSteel, 438 U.S. at 244; see also Romein, 503 U.S. at 186. The Fourth
Circuit has noted the Supreme Court's occasional inquiry into whether the contract impairment
disrupted the parties' legitimate expectations. Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of
Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1017 n.7 (4th Cir. 1993) (citing United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 20
n. 17; Allied StructuralSteel, 438 U.S. at 247). The circuit court was unsure whether this inquiry
was different from the inquiry into whether the parties actually relied upon the contractual right
impaired. The court concluded that the reference to legitimate expectations "was merely a
shorthand for reliance." Id.
181. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 244 n.15.
182. Romein, 503 U.S. at 186.
183. Lease Agreement, supra note 96, art. II, § 2.03.

184. MD. CODE ANN., FiN. INST. § 13-723(b) (1992 & Supp. 1995).
185. Lease Agreement, supra note 96, art. V, § 5.03.
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their right to use Camden Yards for playing baseball games, 186 and the
187
covenant of quiet enjoyment.
The Assistant Attorney General argued that Section 13-723 did not
impair the contract.
As existing law confers on the [MSA] express power to
"regulate the use and operation of the stadium[,]" and the
Orioles have agreed in the lease to "comply with all material
laws," it can be said the lease recognizes the reserve power of
the State and that the enactment of the legislation would not be
1 88
an impairment of contract.
However, the Fourth Circuit recently rejected a similar argument
advanced by Baltimore in a suit brought by its unionized police and
teachers after the City reduced their salaries. 189 Baltimore argued that the
contracts were "expressly subject to the Baltimore City Charter[,] which
...permitted the reductions." 190 The majority noted that the law only
authorized reductions in appropriations. 191 The court further stated:
[If the law] were read to authorize any contravention of
contractual terms ...it is doubtful that there ever existed (or
ever could exist) a contract between the City and its employees,
because there would have been a failure of mutual obligation.
More importantly, even assuming such a failure were not fatal
to contract formation, the [law], so read, would almost certainly
violate the Contract Clause itself. 192
The Assistant Attorney General attempted a similar expansion of the
MSA's power to regulate the use and operation of Camden Yards.
Although it does not cover every possibility, the Lease Agreement between
the Orioles and the MSA encompasses much in terms of use and
regulation.193 It does, however, expressly provide:
186. Id.
187. Id. art. XXII.
188. Letter from Richard E. Israel, Assistant Attorney General, State of Maryland, to
Samuel I. Rosenberg, Delegate, and John A. Pica, Jr., Senator, Maryland General Assembly,
supra note 71, at 5 (citation omitted).
189. Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012 (4th Cir. 1993).
Facing a budgetary deficit, the City reduced the salaries of its employees by one percent. The
police and teachers challenged the action on the ground that it impermissibly impaired their
contracts with the City. Id.at 1014.
190. Id. at 1015-16.
191. Id. at 1016.
192. Id. at 1016 n.5.
193. The lease addresses, in part, the following: permitted uses (by both the Orioles and
the MSA) of the ballpark and the Camden Yards site; concession stands; parking; maintenance,
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[The MSA] shall have no right to approve or veto the
ORIOLES' decisions regarding the business operations of the
ORIOLES or the baseball operations of the Baltimore Orioles.
The ORIOLES shall have the sole and exclusive right to make
all such decisions in accordance with their own needs as the
ORIOLES deem appropriate, without interference from MSA
194

Permitting the MSA to contravene such specific contractual obligations
would, in the view of the Fourth Circuit, violate the Contract Clause.
C. MarylandHas Substantially Impaired This Contract
The second question concerns whether the impairment of the contract
is substantial.95 The Supreme Court has never specifically defined
"substantial"' except to say that "substantial" is more than "minimal"' 19 6
but less than "total." 19 7 The Fourth Circuit has interpreted "substantial" to
mean that "the contract right or obligation impaired was one that induced
the parties to enter into the contract and upon the continued existence of
which they have especially relied ... ,"198 Under the Fourth Circuit's
view, Section 13-723 substantially impairs the Orioles' contract with the
State.
The main reason the Orioles entered into the lease with the State was
to play baseball at Camden Yards. 199 The MSA purchased the Camden
Yards site and constructed and developed the ballpark in return for a
commitment from the Orioles to play all their home games there. 200 The
team and the American League relied on being able to play at Camden
Yards when the season schedule, team travel arrangements, and
promotional dates were set. Section 13-723 completely destroyed the
repairs, improvements and operations; private suites; scoreboards, videoboard and related
systems; advertising and announcements;

ballpark security;

insurance;

indemnification;

remedies for default; arbitration, force majeure, and eminent domain clauses; assignment,
subletting successors; ballpark names and proprietary symbols; surrender of premises;

administration of agreement; and interpretation and construction. Lease Agreement, supra note
96, at iii-xiv.
194. Id. art. IV, § 4.10.
195. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1017.

196. "Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may end the inquiry at its first stage."
Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 245 (1978) (footnote omitted).
197. "Total destruction of contractual expectations is not necessary for a finding of
substantial impairment." Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S.
400, 411 (1983) (citation omitted).
198. Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1018.

199. See generally Lease Agreement, supra note 96.
200. Id.at 2, Recital M.
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contractual rights that induced the Orioles to sign the lease and upon which
it especially relied. 201 There was no realistic possibility of any team
20 2
reaching the seventy-five percent threshold.
The impairment is substantial for other reasons as well. First, aside
from Memorial Stadium, the Orioles' former home, there may not be a
facility in the immediate vicinity that is suitable for major league
baseball. 0 3 Second, even if a facility were available, arranging its use on
short notice for playing an eighty-one-game home schedule would be a
monumental task. These arrangements would include leasing the facility,
resolving conflicts with the facility's pre-existing schedule, establishing
new delivery schedules with vendors, changing pre-existing advertising,
and accommodating possible city or county concerns about the sudden
influx of people in the neighborhood around the facility. Third, and most
importantly, the Orioles agreed in the Lease Agreement neither to relocate
the team from Baltimore nor to play any of its home games at any location
other than Camden Yards. 2 4 Thus, the Orioles would have to break their
lease and face a logistical nightmare in order to play with replacement
players. For all these reasons, the impairment of the contract is
substantial.
D. Section 13-723 Is Neither Reasonable nor Necessary to
Serve an ImportantState Interest
The final issue is whether the State is impairing its own contractual
obligations. Unquestionably, Maryland is a party to the lease of Camden
Yards,20 5 and Section 13-723 impairs the State's contractual obligations.
However, this only begins the inquiry.
It is well-settled that a State cannot contract away its sovereign police
power.20 6 "'This power ...is an exercise of the sovereign right of the
Government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort and general
welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts

201. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
202. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
203. Memorial Stadium is used by a Canadian Football League team. Michael Farber, But
Don't Call Them the Colts, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 25, 1994, at 56. It is unclear what the
lease arrangements were at the time of the strike and if the stadium could have accommodated
the Orioles, in terms of parking, seating capacity, or field conditions.
204. Lease Agreement, supranote 96, art. XX.
205. The Maryland Stadium Authority, a party to the contract, is an instrumentality of the
State. S.719, Regular Sess., 1995 Md. Laws 6.
206. Allied Structural Steel v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978); United States Trust Co.
v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1977).
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between individuals."'' 20 7 Maryland made a substantial investment in
Camden Yards, and, under particular circumstances, may be able to
employ its police powers to protect that investment and the public welfare.
However, the Contract Clause limits "the power of a State to abridge
existing contractual relationships, even in the exercise of its otherwise
legitimate police power. '2 08 Thus, "an impairment may be constitutional
if it is reasonable and necessary to serve an important public purpose. In
applying this standard, however, complete deference to a legislative
assessment of reasonableness and necessity is not appropriate because the
State's self-interest is at stake." 2 09 Under this analysis, Section 13-723 is
neither reasonable nor necessary to further Maryland's interest in Camden
Yards.
1. Section 13-723 Is Not a Reasonable Exercise of Maryland's
Police Power
To determine "reasonableness" under the Contract Clause analysis,
courts examine factors such as whether the legislation (1) addresses a
broad, generalized economic or social problem; 2 10 (2) regulates an area
never before subject to state regulation; 2 11 (3) narrowly targets a specific
2 13
group; 2 12 and (4) is temporary or permanent.
First, Section 13-723 may be viewed as addressing a broad,
generalized economic problem, although part of that problem is selfinduced.
The State's Department of Economic and Employment
Development estimated that the elimination of the entire baseball season
from Camden Yards would result in a $225 million loss to the State. 2 14
All games would be eliminated because no team could meet the
Section 13-723 limit of twenty-five percent replacement players. 2 15
However, if all games were played with replacement players, revenues
could drop substantially and result in a net loss. The loss would not likely
reach $225 million because the games would probably generate some

207. Allied Structural Steel, 438 U.S. at 241 (quoting Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473,
480 (1905)).
208. Id. at 242.

209. United States Trust, 431 U.S. at 25-26.
210. Allied StructuralSteel, 438 U.S. at 250.
211. Id.

212. Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1021 (4th Cir. 1993).
213. Id.
214. S. 719, Regular Sess., 1995 Md. Laws 6 (Dep't of Fiscal Servs. for Md. Gen.
Assembly (1995)).
215. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
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revenue. 2 16 Consequently, the Statute has the potential effect of worsening
the economic problem.
Second, although a state may regulate labor relations to the extent not
preempted by federal law, previous baseball work stoppages were free
from state regulation. Therefore, neither the Orioles nor the American
League would have expected state interference with the contract.
Third, the legislation targeted only baseball teams. In Contract
Clause litigation, courts particularly disapprove of legislation narrowly
2 17
aimed at specific targets.
Fourth, the Statute's temporary nature belies the State's need for it.
Given the eight work stoppages in baseball since 1972,218 and that the
lease for Camden Yards lasts for thirty years,2 19 there is little likelihood
that Section 13-723, effective only for one season, could reasonably
protect Maryland's long-term investment. 220
For these reasons,
Section 13-723 is not a reasonable exercise of Maryland's police powers.
2. Section 13-723 Is Not Necessary to Further Maryland's
Specific Interest
To determine "necessity" under the Contract Clause analysis, courts
require that (1) a less drastic modification would have worked or (2) the
important state interest could have been achieved using alternative
means. 22 1 Here, Maryland does not meet either requirement.
Compared to 1994 figures, attendance for major league ballparks
dropped by twenty percent after the strike. 222 Even the Orioles, whose
owner and organization arguably fought for the fans' interest more than
any other club, lost more than 150,000 fans in attendance through its first

216. There is the possibility that operating Camden Yards with replacements would
produce a greater loss than not operating it at all. If few fans attended, the initial costs of
operation could exceed the revenue generated by more than $225 million.
217. See Baltimore Teachers Union, 6 F.3d at 1021 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462
U.S. 176, 191 (1983); Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co., 459 U.S. 400,
412 n.13 (1983); Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 248 (1978)).
218. Newhan, supra note 18, at Al.
219. Lease Agreement, supra note 96, art. II, § 2.03.
220. Had Maryland not included a sunset provision, § 13-723 would potentially affect
future baseball strikes and potentially protect Maryland's long-term investment. In that case,
however, the statute would not be narrowly tailored because it would not be temporary. This
highlights that Maryland was in a no-win situation and would have been better off not enacting
the statute.
221. United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 29-30 (1977).
222. Mark Maske, With Spring in Its Step, Grand Old Game Starts Anew, WASH. POST,
Feb. 11, 1996, at D8.
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nineteen home games. 223 Regardless of the good intentions of the State,
224
baseball fans alienated by the strike were going to boycott games.
Eventually, though, the fans do return. 225 In 1982, baseball set an
attendance record the year after a fifty-day strike. 2 26 During the off-season
between 1995 and 1996, the Cleveland Indians sold out every home game
on their schedule. 227 Strike history illustrates that the best course of action
is to take no action at all.
VI. CONCLUSION ("IT AIN'T OVER 'TIL IT'S OVER")

The Maryland Statute was not challenged in court for several reasons.
8
First, Oriole majority owner Peter Angelos was in favor of the law. 22
Second, the Players Association ended the strike and reported back to
work. Third, major league baseball may have had other options before
challenging a state statute in court. However, as shown, Section 13-723
would probably not have survived judicial review.
Maryland may still have options if it wants to ban replacement
players from Camden Yards in the future. The MSA and the Orioles may
be able to amend their stadium lease agreement to ban the use of
replacement players. They also may be able to modify the lease to
incorporate provisions that would protect Maryland's substantial
investment, i.e., revenues based on a minimum attendance figure. It is
unclear if the American League, which had to approve the Lease
Agreement, 229 would oppose such modifications.
Fortunately for
Maryland, it has an ally in Peter Angelos, who refused "to participate in
the replacement player charade. '230 Any solution involving Mr. Angelos
may have a great chance of avoiding a legal challenge.
These solutions will treat only the symptoms of major league
baseball's labor disease; they will not take baseball off the disabled list.

223. William Gildea, Fans Taking Themselves out of the Ballgame, WASH. POST, June 11,
1995, at Al.
224. Id.
225. Ross Newhan, It May Be Now or Never for Baseball, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1995, at

C3.
226. Tom Verducci, The Play's the Thing, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, July 10, 1995, at 16, 18.
227. Maske, supra note 222, at D8.

228. Letter from Peter G. Angelos to the Honorable Thomas Bromwell, Chairman,
Maryland Senate Finance Committee 1 (Feb. 22, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal).

229. Lease Agreement, supra note 96, art. XXX, § 30.01.
230. Letter from Peter G. Angelos to the Honorable Thomas Bromwell, Chairman,
Maryland Senate Finance Committee, supra note 228, at 1.
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More than two years have passed since the strike, and owners and players
have still not agreed on a new collective bargaining agreement. Reaching
that agreement and preventing the work stoppages that have accompanied
every labor negotiation since 1972 must be major league baseball's top
priority.
The one constant through all the years ... has been baseball.
America has rolled by like an army of steamrollers. It's been
erased like a blackboard, rebuilt, and erased again. But baseball
has marked the time. This ... game ... is a part of our past
23 1
.... It reminds us all that once was good and could be again.
Peter F. Giamporcaro*

231. FIELDOF DREAMS, at t:O1:24:44 (Universal City Studios, Inc. 1989).
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